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Officer Saverio Alesi, a New York City patrolman,
was in uniform and on duty on Eighth Avenue be
tween 42nd and 43rd Streets, when he saw a white
man, Vincent Magda, and a black man conversing
on the other side of the street. He saw the men
exchange something, after which the black man
looked across the street in the officer's direction. The
black man turned, according to the officer, "in a
rapid motion" and then walked away. Magda crossed
the street toward the officer and began walking down
Eighth Avenue. As he passed Alesi, the officer tapped
him on the shoulder and asked him to stop. Magda
turned to face the officer, slowed down, but con
tinued, walking backwards. The officer followed
him for several steps and Magda stopped. Officer
Alesi asked him what had occurred between him and
the other man. Magda at first denied that anything
had occurred, but in response to a second question
from the officer, Magda told him he had bought a
marijuana cigarette for a dollar. He then handed
the cigarette to Officer Alesi.
Officer Alesi placed Magda under arrest for pos
session of marijuana and then frisked him com
pletely. The search produced an unloaded handgun
and a demand note which began, "This is a robbery.
Keep your hands where I can see them. . . ." The
evidence linked Magda to a series of unsolved bank
robberies in New York, Washington, Miami, and
New Orleans. Magda was indicted in federal dis
trict court for tht New York bank robbery. He was
also charged in state court with possession of mari
juana and the handgun.

What constitutes reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity?

Magda moved in both the state and federal pro
ceedings to suppress the evidence found pursuant to
the search on the grounds that the initial stop by
Officer Alesi was not justified, as required by Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), by a reasonable suspi
cion that criminal activity was afoot.
Hearings were conducted in both state and federal
courts. Officer Alesi testified for the prosecution in
both instances, giving substantially the same testi
mony. He recounted his experience with the police
department-11 years, although he had been on
foot patrol in the Eighth Avenue-42nd Street vicin
ity for only six months. He said that, although he
had not made any street arrests for narcotics in that
area, he had observed two such arrests. He said that
the area was known to police as a "narcotics prone
location." And finally, he said, his suspicion of crimi
nal activity was aroused when "the male black ex
changed something and he seen me, he turned in a
rapid motion and proceeded westbound." Neither
the black man nor Magda was previously known to
Officer Alesi.
The state court granted the motion to suppress
the seized evidence pursuant to People v. Cantor, 36
N.Y.2d 106, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 324 N.E.2d 872
(1975), which requires a patrolman to have a rea
sonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred
in order to stop a person in a public place. Judge
Kleiman ruled that denial of the motion would mean
that a mere exchange of hands in a high narcotics
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activity is afoot." [Citations omitted.] Id. at 764.
On remand, Magda was convicted.
Magda has been perceived by some as a significant
departure from the standards countenanced by the
Supreme Court in Terry and its progeny to justify a
police officer's investigatory stop of a person. See,
e.g., "Investigative Stops in Urban Centers: Uphold
ing the Constable's Whim," 44 Brooklyn L. Rev. 963
(1978). The facts observed by Officer Alesi, had
they occurred in a neighborhood not characterized by
its crime rate, may well have been insufficient to
justify a stop. Indeed, the Terry companion case,
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 ( 1968), although
focusing upon the illegality of a search rather than
an initial stop, specifically held that a person's mere
conversation with known narcotics addicts was not
the sort of articulable fact required to support a
police intrusion.
Officer Alesi, of course, had no information that
the man with whom Magda made the exchange was
either a narcotics addict or a dealer. The operative
difference in Magda is clearly the high crime area
factor. Thus, Magda seems to suggest that, although
certain activities may be insufficient to justify a stop
in one neighborhood, they may be sufficient in
another.

area would justify the stop of a person, and that such
facts were insufficient to support a reasonable suspi
cion of criminal activity.
The federal district court also granted Magda's
motion on the basis of New York law, although
Judge Carter acknowledged that the same result was
compelled under federal law. U.S. v. Magda, 409
F.Supp. 734,740 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
A "rather lenient" standard
The government appealed the federal suppression
or_der and the court of appeals reversed. U.S. v.
Magda, 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 878 (1977). Judge Van Graafeiland, writ
ing for the majority, acknowledged the test for an
investigative stop as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 ( 1968): the stop is constitutionally per
missible only if the police officer can "point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with ra
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably war
rant that intrusion." Id. at 21. Under such circum
stances, the Second Circuit ruled, the conditions
precedent to a stop are "rather lenient." U.S. v.
Magda, 409 F. Supp. at 759.
The Magda court placed heavy emphasis upon
the officer's belief that the area was "narcotics prone."
Moreover, the police officer's 11 years' experience,
albeit in other neighborhoods, was "not to be lightly
brushed aside." Id. at 758. Finally, the court ob
served that the reasonableness of the police officer's
conduct may be determined by the nature of the stop.
Since the officer did not attempt to �arass, intimidate,
humiliate, or physically restrain Magda, the scope of
the intrusion was minimal and "reasonably related to
the observations which caused Alesi to become sus
picious." Id. at 759.
District Judge Motley, sitting by designation, dis
sented. She argued that the decision permits a police
officer to "make an investigatory stop based on a
combination of entirely innocent factors," thereby
setting "a new minimum standard for the 'reasonable
suspicion' necessary to justify such a stop." Id.
(Motley, J., dissenting). Moreover, the application
of the "narcotics prone location" factor is improper
in order to justify a stop. Judge Motley explained:
"Even when it can be shown that criminal activity
is more likely in one geographical area than another,
courts are extremely hesitant to acknowledge this as
a strong factor in satisfying the standards required
for an interrogatory stop. . . . The fact that the
area is notorious for criminal activity can only be
considered when other less ambiguous facts are pres
ent which would lead one to suspect that criminal

The border stop parallel
A more recent case, U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975), affords an even more striking
similarity to the facts in Magda. In that case, Mr.
Justice Powell ruled that Border Patrol officers may
not stop an automobile near the Mexican border to
question the occupants about their citizenship on the
ground that the occupants appeared to be of Mexican
descent.
The government sought to justify a border stop as
a minimal intrusion outweighed by the public inter
est. The Supreme Court agreed that 85 percent of
all undocumented aliens in the United States are
from Mexico; it agreed that the Border Patrol's
resources are inadequate to prevent illegal crossings
along a 2,000 mile border; it agreed that the influx
of illegal aliens creates significant economic and
social problems for the United States; it agreed that
the intrusion was a modest one. Id. at 878-80.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held, this acknowl
edged "valid public interest" does not justify an
interference with individual liberty resulting from
a stop. The Supreme Court expressed particular con
cern for the rights of hundreds of thousands of inno
cent persons who travel lawfully near the Mexican
border and who would be subjected "to potentially
unlimited interference with their use of the high-
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ways," id. at 882, if physical appearance were the
sole criterion for reasonable suspicion.
The parallels between the facts in Magda and
Brignoni-Ponce are difficult to ignore: both involved
innocent behavior by the suspects (exchanging some
thing on a street corner vs. appearing to be of Mexi
can descent); both stops took place in areas charac
terized by law enforcement officers as high crime
locations (narcotics prone area vs. proximity to the
Mexican border); both involved arguably experi
enced officers; and both involved brief investigative
stops for questioning.
The Magda majority does not suggest that the
nature of the intrusion by Officer Alesi was different
from that of the Border Patrol in Brignoni-Ponce.
Instead, the Second Circuit, in balancing the "gravity
of the intrusion" against the "need for the stop," 547
F.2d at 758, seems to imply that the magnitude of
the public interest was greater in Magda than in
Brignoni-Ponce, although the court does not say so.
Indeed, Magda relies on Brignoni-Ponce as "autho
rizing brief investigative stops, of the type at issue
here, based on reasonable suspicion." Id. The Magda
opinion, however, makes no atempt to compare the
facts in the two cases and simply fails to mention
the Brignoni-Ponce holding: that a person's appear
ance of Mexican descent near the Mexican border
will not justify an investigative stop.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have relied on
Magda in determining whether otherwise innocent
behavior which occurs in a high crime context can
form the basis for a stop by a police officer. The
drug courier cases serve as apt illustrations.

such factors as: traveling from a "source city"; being
Hispanic ( especially Mexican); traveling long dis
tances with little luggage; failing to acknowledge an
apparent companion; and acting nervous. Drug En
forcement Administration agents accosted Wester
bann-Martinez and, when he failed to produce iden
tification, asked to look in his luggage. He assented
and drugs were found.
On the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
seized by the agents, the court noted that the factors
making up the drug courier profile were neutral
consistent with non-criminal activity-and could not,
therefore, support the agent's suspicion that criminal
activity was in progress. The court said that Magda
"probably represents the minimum interplay of ele
ments needed to establish reasonable suspicion under
Terry." 435 F. Supp. at 697. In granting the
defendant's motion to suppress, the court declined
to hold that a combination of otherwise innocent
circumstances constitutes articulable facts sufficient
to justify the agents' suspicions.
More recent federal drug courier cases, however,
seem to have adopted the "rather lenient" standard
recognized in Magda. In U.S. v. Flores, 462 F. Supp.
702 (E.D. NS. 1978), for example, an apparent
companion of certain suspects, who matched several
neutral factors on a drug courier profile (including,
inter alia, being the last to deplane, having padlocks
but no luggage tags on suitcases, and arriving fro?I
a "source city") was overheard by DEA agents cor
recting the suspects as to their next destination. The
apparent companion, until that point, had been
ignored.
Those facts, the court held, were sufficient to sup
port the agents' suspicion that they were transporting
illegal drugs, and drugs seized following the stop of
the suspects were admissible. The government had
not, said the court, relied on "any single fact which
is 'perhaps innocent in itself' [quoting Terry] but in
the . . . set of circumstances 'which taken together
warranted further investigation' [quoting Terry]."
Moreover, the court stressed the need for the inves
tigative stop, referring at length to U.S. v. Oates,
560 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1977):
"A. significant portion of that need is supplied by
the inherent odiousness and gravity of the offense,
the societal costs of which, in terms of ruined and
wasted lives, are staggering. We further believe that
the need for the stop was supported by the fact that
quick and decisive action may be required when
suspected large-scale dope peddlers are about to
board a jet aircraft [footnote omitted] with narcotics
which, as is commonly known, are a "readily dispos
able commodity." U.S. v. Flores, supra, at 707.

The drug courier cases
A familiar technique employed by both federal
and state drug enforcement officials is to compare
the activities of travelers-usually in airports-with
a "profile" which fhe agency has identified as typical
of a drug carrier. Such typical factors might include:
use of small denomination currency to buy an air
plane ticket; travel to or from drug import centers;
absence of luggage or use of an empty suitcase;
nervousness; and the use of an alias, among other
things. See, e.g., U.S. v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,
719-20 (6th Cir. 1977). Passengers matching such
a profile are stopped, and, occasionally, contraband is
discovered. A number of courts have had opportuni
ties to assess the propriety of evidence seized in this
manner.
In U.S. v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690
(E.D. N.Y. 1977), the defendant passenger was
stopped because he matched a "drug courier profile"
used to screen airport arrivals. The profile included
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similar facts, with the possible exception of Con
stantine. Those cases in which Magda furnishes the
authority for upholding investigative stops involve far
more extensive concrete observations by the officers.
Indeed, there appears to be no acceptance among
state courts for the proposition that nonsuspicious or
marginally suspicious behavior becomes sufficiently
suggestive of criminal conduct when it occurs in a
high crime neighborhood.
At least two state courts have considered and dis
approved investigative stops quite similar to the one
in Magda. In State v. Smith, 347 So. 2d 1127 (La.
1977), police officers in a high crime area observed
the defendant walking across a housing project court
yard wearing a heavy coat on a sunny winter day.
Since the officers did not recognize him, they stopped
him and found cocaine. The Louisiana Supreme
Court ruled that "[p ]olice officers are not entitled to
stop at will any person in a high -crime area just be
cause that person is unknown to them, nor because he
is wearing a leather jacket on a warm December day."
Id. at 1129. Two judges, emphasizing the high crime
area and the defendant's inappropriate dress, dis
sented, citing Magda.
In a similar case, the California Supreme Court
recently refused to sanction the "high crime area" fac
tor as sufficient to uphold an investigative stop by a
police officer. In People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638,
156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115 (1979), the de
fendant, a white man, was observed by police officers
with a group of black men near a predominantly
black, low-income housing project in a high crime
neighborhood. When the men saw the officers they
attempted to return to the building they had just left,
but the elevator had closed so they "huddled" to
gether. An officer got out of the patrol car and
walked toward the group. The defendant began
walking away quickly. One of the officers told him to
stop and he complied. A pat search revealed a con
cealed firearm. The court held that the initial deten
tion was not supported by sufficient articulable facts:
"[T]he officer's assertion that the location lay in a
'high crime' area does not elevate these facts into a
reasonable suspicion of criminality. The 'high crime
area' factor is not an 'activity' of an individual. Many
citizens of this state are forced to live in areas that
have 'high crime' rates or they come to these areas to
shop, work, play, transact business, or visit relatives
or friends. The spectrum of legitimate human be
havior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas.
As a result, this court has appraised this factor with
caution and has been reluctant to conclude that a
location's crime rate transforms otherwise innocent-

Thus, the court relied to a significant extent on
the nature of the suspected offense-large-scale traf
ficking in heroin-in striking the balance in the
government's favor. Similar results involving drug
couriers have been reached by the Second Circuit in
U.S. v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979), and
U.S. v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979). Magda
was cited as a principal authority in both cases.
Accord, U.S. v. Hernandez-Rojas, 470 F. Supp. 1212
(E.D. N.Y. 1979). See also U.S. v. Chamblis, 425
F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Mich. 1977), where the court
upheld the initial stop of the defendant at an airport
but granted his motion to suppress evidence seized
after he was taken to an officer for further, more
extensive questioning; this further interrogation was
held to constitute an unreasonable extension of the
scope of the stop. Id. at 1335.
The scales tip in the government's favor not only
in the large-scale drug trafficking cases, however. On
occasion, where law enforcement personnel have
relied on a matrix of neutral factors to support their
suspicions, investigative stops have been upheld. For
example, the Fourth Circuit, in U.S. v. Constantine,
567 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 926 (1978), upheld the stop of a suspect and
the subsequent seizure of cocaine where the only
articulable facts relied upon by the officer were that
he had never seen the defendant in the area before,
the defendant had gotten out of his car and spoken
to the dirver of a van parked nearby, and the area
had a high incidence of vandalism. "An area's dis
position toward criminal activity . . . [t]he mood
of the precinct and the circumambient activities"
observed by the officer are proper bases for a stop,
opined the court in a per curiam decision citing
Magda. U.S. v. Constantine, 567 F.2d at 267. Cf.
U.S. v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978).
Acceptance and rejection of Magda's "lenient"
standard

Although a few federal courts have relied on

Magda to uphold investigative stops where a number

of otherwise neutral factors, taken together, prompted
a police officer's suspicions, those cases do not neces
sarily describe a trend toward authorizing all stops in
high crime areas as might have been feared. The
facts in Magda itself were scanty, and it is doubtful
that, had Magda consummated his exchange in a
peaceful, residential neighborhood, his actions would
have aroused Officer Alesi's curiosity, much less his
suspicion.
But Magda does not seem to have gained wide
spread acceptance in any appellate court based on
4

appearing circumstances justifying the seizure of an
individual." 597 P.2d at 119.
Thus, the California Supreme Court holds directly
that neither an area's disposition to criminal activity
nor the "mood" of the precinct, nor the "circum
ambient activities" of the neighborhood counte
nanced by Constantine can transform innocent behav
ior into the basis for suspecting that a crime has been
or is about to be committed. While the court does not
go so far as to say that the character of the neighbor
hood can never be a factor in arousing the officer's
suspicion, the suspect himself, by his conduct, must
do something to suggest that he is up tQ no good.

Brown and another man walking away from each
other in an alley. They had never seen Brown in the
area before, but they testified that the neighborhood
had a high incidence of drug traffic. Brown was
stopped. No contraband was found, but he was
charged and later convicted of failing to identify him
self to a police officer.
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court ap
pears to have adopted the view previously taken by
the Supreme Courts of Louisiana and California in
Smith and Bower: that the high crime propensity of
an area is insufficient to tip the scale in the govern
ment's favor. Police officers are justified in stopping
a person for questioning only where his behavior it
self suggests criminal activity. Brown, however, does
not purport to disturb rulings in those cases in which
furtive or otherwise suspicious behavior by the sus
pect prompts the officer's attention.
Although Magda may be distinguishable from
Brown on the ground that Officer Alesi saw Magda
exchange something with the other man, and that the
other man looked around quickly, Brown makes it
clear that, absent those suspicious facts, a person's
mere presence in a high crime neighborhood does not
elevate otherwise innocent behavior to a level justify
ing an investigative stop.

The "high crime area" factor taken alone
The extent to which a police officer may rely on
the high crime character of a neighborhood to sup
port his suspicion of illicit activity has recently been
rather sharply defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Brown v. Texas,- U.S. - (No. 77-6673, decided
6/25/79), Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous court, held: "The fact that appellant was
in a neighborho9d frequented by drug users, standing
alone, is not a basjs for concluding that appellant him
self was engaged in criminal conduct."
In that case, police officers in El Paso observed
RECENT CASES
Minnesota Court Bars Use of Warrant to Search
Lawyers' Offices
After the Supreme Court held that premises of
innocent third parties may be the target of search
warants, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
( 1978), a growing trend developed around the coun
try to apply that ruling to the search of lawyers' of
fices. In the first important judicial ruling on the
use of search warrants to look through the files of at
torneys, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
searches pursuant to warrant are unreasonable in the
absence of proof that the lawyer himself is involved
in the commission of crime or that the document
might be destroyed if a warrant is not used. O'Connor
v. Johnson, - N.W.2d - (Minn. 1979). The court
ruled that the examination of lawyers' files may only
be accomplished by the use of a subpoena providing
advance notice and the right to contest the examina
tion.
While the Supreme Court rejected the necessity of
proceeding by means of a subpoena in searching an
innocent party's premises, the Minnesota court cited
added considerations that make this course of action
necessary when lawyers' offices are the target of the
search. The court noted that "even the most particu-

lar warrant cannot adequately safeguard client confi
dentiality, the attorney-client privilege, the attorney's
work product, and the criminal defendant's constitu
tional right to counsel of all of the attorney's clients."
In order to avoid exposure of documents which might
compromise any of these judicially-recognized inter
ests, the court concluded that a subpoena must be ob
tained for production of the documents.
Absent Owner of Occupied Vehicle Lacks Standing
to Challenge Its Search, First Circuit Holds
The First Circuit has held that the owner of a ve
hicle who is not present at the time of its search does
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
vehicle sufficient to give him standing to challenge
the search. U.S. v. Dall, -F.2d- (1st Cir. 1979).
The court relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), from
which it derived the principle that ownership of a
searched vehicle does not automatically indicate a
sufficient privacy interest to give the owner standing.
While the Court in Rakas stated that a proprietary
interest in property is highly significant in detennin
ing legitimate· expectations of privacy for standing
purposes, the First Circuit found that, under the cir-
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The police had put defendants' house under sur
veillance after receiving a tip that it was the center
of extensive narcotics dealing. After a week of sur
veillance, the police had developed sufficient informa
tion to justify issuance of a warrant to search the
premises. Rather than obtain a warrant, however,
the police kept the house under surveillance until the
alleged supplier entered the premises, a period of five
additional days. At that point, the police entered the
premises, claiming exigent circumstances, and se
cured it for four hours or more until a warrant was
obtained.
The court found that the prior opportunity to ob
tain a warrant precluded the police contention that
exigent circumstances existed for the entry. The court
noted that a police officer "cannot create exigent cir
cumstances by his own inaction." Further, the court
refused to find that merely indicating the readily de
structible nature of drugs and the possibility that the
suspects might escape is a sufficient showing of exi
gency without further concrete information that these
possibilities are in fact likely to occur. Finally, the
court held that securing of premises pending arrival
of a search warrant is itself a major intrusion requir
ing exigent circumstances in order to justify it. No
such exigencies existed here.

cumstances present in Dall, the defendant had failed
to show a privacy interest.
The vehicle was in the possession of three persons
given permission to use it by the defendant. Those
persons, when stopped by the police, disclaimed any
knowledge of the contents of the compartment
searched by the police, in which stolen property was
found. However, the court found it important that
the defendant, upon being contacted after the search,
disclaimed knowledge of the stolen property and con
tended that the compartment in question was empty.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the
defendant had not met his burden of showing a pri
vacy interest in the vehicle.
Eighth Circuit Bars Use of Collateral Estoppel to
Preclude § 1983 Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
Claim

The Eighth Circuit has held that a civil rights
plaintiff alleging a Fourth Amendment violation un
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be precluded from liti
gating his claim because the issue was decided against
him in a state criminal prosecution. McCurry v. Al
len, -F.2d-(8th Cir. 1979).
While some courts have applied the doctrine of col
lateral estoppel to the § 1983 setting, those courts
have specifically noted that alternative avenues of re
lief were available to the plaintiff, such as direct liti
gation of the propriety of the state court ruling
through federal habeas corpus review. However,
under the Supreme Court ruling in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 ( 1976), Fourth Amendment claims are
precluded in federal habeas proceedings if the claim
was susceptible to full review in state courts. There
fore, a § 1983 action is likely to be the only type of
federal review open to a state defendant whose
Fourth Amendment claim has been adversely decided
in state court.
Since the civil rights statute has an explicit policy
of providing a federal forum for constitutional claims
otherwise precluded from review, the Eighth Circuit
held that application of collateral estoppel to Fourth
Amendment claims under § 1983 would defeat the
congressional intent in enacting that statute.

The Montana Supreme Court has moved to bar
any further use of electronic surveillance in that state
until the state legislature adopts a statutory scheme
to implement the provisions of the federal wiretap
statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, commonly known
as Title III. State v. Hanley, - P.2d - (Mont.
1979).
The court held that it was the intent of Congress
in adopting Title III that a state adopt specific au
thorization and set procedural guidelines prior to
permitting electronic surveillance. In reviewing the
state's statutes regarding electronic surveillance, the
Montana court found them inadequate to meet
the requirements of Title III. The court therefore
imposed its ban.

Oregon Court Discusses "Exigent Circumstances"
Sufficient to Justify Warrantless Entry of House

New Binder for 1980-81 Issues Available
With this issue, Search and Seizure Law Report

Montana High Court Bans All Electronic Surveil
lance Until Statutory Safeguards Adopted

commences Volume 7. An index, to be filed in the
now complete Volume 5-6 binder, is enclosed with
this issue.
The Volume 7-8 binder, in which to file 1980
and 198 I issues, is now available for $5. Orders may
be sent to Clark Boardman Company, Ltd., 435
Hudson Street, New York, N.Y. 10014.

The Oregon Supreme Court has held that the war
rantless entry and securing of premises pending ar
rival of a search warrant were not justified by exigent
circumstances when the police had ample information
to obtain a search warrant for at least five days prior
to the entry. State v. Matsen, 601 P.2d 784 (Or.
1979).
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